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INTRODUCTION

“‘. . . [W]e should make something like that, something with that groove.’”1
When R&B singer-songwriter Robin Thicke stated those now infamous words
in a May 2013 interview for GQ magazine, he was at the height of his music
career. His new single, “Blurred Lines,” featuring T.I. and Pharrell Williams, was
a chart-topping sensation.2 With an upbeat tempo and rhythmic hook, the song
was an instant hit, catching the attention of a wide audience of music listeners,
and it quickly became apparent that its popularity would be anything but shortlived. After its successful debut, “Blurred Lines” continued to hold the number
one spot on Billboard’s Hot 100, R&B, Hip-Hop, and Pop charts, while steadily
climbing to the top of others, making it Billboard’s “Song of the Summer.”3
Furthermore, the accompanying music video was equally, if not more, successful,
as it went viral with more than 62 million views in three months. 4 Clearly, the
“groove” that inspired Thicke was something special—or was it?
This “groove” Thicke mentioned in the GQ interview was a tribute to Marvin
Gaye’s 1977 hit “Got To Give It Up.”5 When asked to describe the origin of his
new single “Blurred Lines,” Thicke recalled a conversation he had in the studio
with collaborator Pharrell Williams.6 Specifically, Thicke said he stated to
Williams that “one of [his] favorite songs of all time was Marvin Gaye’s ‘Got To
Give It Up,’” and he and Williams “should make something like that, something
with that groove.”7 Within a half-hour of experimenting with the “groove,”
Thicke and Williams wrote “Blurred Lines,” and the entire song was recorded
and finished within two hours. 8 At the time, Thicke likely considered his

1 Stelios Phili, Robin Thicke on That Banned Video, Collaborating with 2 Chainz and Kendrick
Lamar, and His New Film, GQ (May 7, 2013), https://www.gq.com/story/robin-thickeinterview-blurred-lines-music-video-collaborating-with-2-chainz-and-kendrick-lamar-mercy.
2 Gary Trust, Robin Thicke’s ‘Blurred Lines’ is Billboard’s Song of the Summer, BILLBOARD (Sept.
5, 2013), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/5687036/robin-thickes-blurred-lines-isbillboards-song-of-the-summer (discussing the immediate success of “Blurred Lines” on
Billboard’s music charts).
3 Id.
4 Jason Lipshutz, Robin Thicke, Miley Cyrus, & Clearing Up Blurred Lines in Music Videos
(Opinion), BILLBOARD (June 25, 2013), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/popshop/1568125/robin-thicke-miley-cyrus-clearing-up-blurred-lines-in-music-videos
(discussing the public reception of Robin Thicke’s provocative music video for his hit single,
“Blurred Lines”).
5 See MARVIN GAYE – “GOT TO GIVE IT UP (PT.1)”, CLASSIC MOTOWN,
https://classic.motown.com/story/marvin-gaye-got-give-pt-1(last visited Sept. 22, 2020, 3:28
p.m.) (providing an overview of the writing, recording, and production of Marvin Gaye’s “Got
To Give It Up” and the “Blurred Lines” copyright infringement controversy).
6 Phili, supra note 1.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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interview answer a harmless, typical response to a common question in the music
industry. He, like many other R&B singer-songwriters, clearly admired Gaye’s
music and likely considered him a creative influence for his artistry and craft.
Therefore, what was the harm in describing the inspiration for the song he and
Williams created?
However, after the interview was published, Thicke was confronted with
backlash from members of Marvin Gaye’s estate, who claimed that “Blurred
Lines” copied the composition of Gaye’s “Got To Give It Up.”9 In response to
the accusations that this hit single was not an original, the “Blurred Lines”
collaborators filed suit against the Gaye family and Bridgeport Music, Inc.10 in
California federal court in August 2013.11 They sought a declaratory judgment
that their composition did not infringe on Gaye’s 1977 hit.12 In March 2018,
after a five-year legal battle of counter-claims and appeals, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals settled the matter.13 The court affirmed the California District
Court’s verdict that Thicke and Williams were liable for copyright infringement
and awarded the Gaye family $5.3 million in damages.14
Upon the announcement of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, panic spread
throughout the entertainment industry. Many began to fear that the Ninth
9 Eriq Gardner, Robin Thicke Sues to Protect ‘Blurred Lines’ from Marvin Gaye’s Family
(Exclusive),
HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER
(Aug.
15,
2013),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/robin-thicke-sues-protect-blurred-607492
(providing overview of filing of initial lawsuit by Marvin Gaye’s estate).
10 Bridgeport Music, Inc. is a music publishing company founded in Michigan in 1969. The
company was initially included as a defendant because it alleged separately that “Blurred Lines”
was an infringement of Funkadelic’s hit song “Sexy Ways.” See Eriq Gardner, Funkadelic’s ‘Sexy’
Dropped
From
‘Blurred
Lines’
Lawsuit,
BILLBOARD
(Mar.
27,
2014),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/6028892/funkadelics-sexy-ways-dropped-fromblurred-lines-lawsuit (discussing the removal of Bridgeport Music, Inc. from The Blurred Lines
Case).
11 Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 2:13CV06004,
2013 WL 4271752 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013). Initially, the case was filed by Thicke and
Williams as Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL
4479500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2015). On appeal, the parties agreed to dismiss Bridgeport Music,
Inc. from the case; therefore, the case proceeded as Williams v. Gaye. See Eriq Gardner, ‘Blurred
Lines’ Lawsuit No Longer Involves Funkadelic’s ‘Sexy Ways’, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Mar. 27,
2014),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/blurred-lines-lawsuit-no-longer691729. Due to the high amount of media exposure surrounding the litigation, the matter
became popularly known as The Blurred Lines Case. For the sake of convenience, this Note
adopts this nomenclature going forward.
12 See Gardner, supra note 9 (discussing the allegations contained in Pharrell Williams and
Robin Thicke’s initial complaint in The Blurred Lines Case).
13 See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018)(affirming district court’s judgement
that Williams and Thicke infringed “Got To Give It Up.”).
14 Ben Sisario, ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict Upheld by Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/21/business/media/blurred-lines-marvin-gayecopyright.html.
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Circuit’s decision could establish a precedent that a “vibe, feeling, or genre” of
music, elements that traditionally are not covered by copyright, would now be
subject to protection.15 Therefore, many contend that The Blurred Lines Case
could ultimately result in a “chilling effect” on creativity16 because it would
encourage litigants to base infringement suits on the “feel” of the song as
opposed to how “it is actually written.”17
As one of the most controversial and high-profile copyright infringement
suits of the decade, The Blurred Lines Case and its possible implications for the
music industry have received thorough examination by pundits, academics, and
lawyers alike.18 Moreover, the fear that immediately paralyzed an entire field of
artists still pervades the music industry post-Blurred Lines. In fact, the increased
number of infringement suits and substantial damage awards for plaintiffs since
the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the Gaye family have worsened this fear.19

15 Ed Christman, ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict: How It Started, Why It Backfired on Robin Thicke and
Why
Songwriters
Should
be
Nervous,
BILLBOARD
(Mar.
13,
2015),
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6502023/blurred-lines-verdict-how-it-startedwhy-it-backfired-on-robin-thicke-and; see also Olivia Lattanza, The Blurred Protection for the Feel
or Groove of a Song under Copyright Law: Examining the Implications of Williams v. Gaye on Creativity in
Music, 35 TOURO L. REV. 723, 726 (2019)(asserting that “the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of the
jury’s decision inappropriately expanded the scope of copyright protection to the feel or
groove of a song,” which will “substantially diminish the creative output of artists.”).
16 Megan Coane & Maximillian Verrelli, Blurred Lines? The Practical Implications of Williams v.
Bridgeport
Music,
AMERICAN
BAR
ASSOCIATION,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/20
15-16/januaryfebruary/blurring_lines_the_practical_implications_of_williams_v_bridgeport_music/#6; see
also Regrettable Denouement in the “Blurred Lines” Dispute, GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW BLOGS:
MUSIC INFRINGEMENT RESOURCE, https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/robinthicke-sues-protect-blurred-607492 (discussing the potential “chilling effect” on creativity and
the rise in similar, opportunistic claims following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in The Blurred
Lines Case).
17 See Christman, supra note 15.
18 See, e.g., Regina Zernay, Casting the First Stone: The Future of Infringement Law After Blurred
Lines, Stay with Me, and Uptown Funk, 20 CHAP. L.R. 177 (2017) (analyzing the current state
of music law and determining whether any significant change has occurred in the way
copyright infringement suits are resolved); see Edwin F. McPherson, Crushing Creativity: The
Blurred Lines Case and Its Aftermath, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 67, 68 (2018)(arguing that
the “Blurred Lines” songwriters were found liable for an idea rather than a tangible expression
of an idea as required by the Copyright Act (the Act); thus, to preserve the intent of the Act,
courts must provide clearer rules for songwriters); see Coane & Verrelli, supra note 16; see also
Tim Wu, Why the “Blurred Lines” Copyright Verdict Should Be Thrown Out, NEW YORKER,(Mar. 12,
2015), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/why-the-blurred-lines-copyrightverdict-should-be-thrown-outd (arguing that the Blurred Lines Case verdict should be “thrown
out” because “to say something ‘sounds like’ something else does not amount to copyright
infringement”).
19 See Jem Aswad, Katy Perry’s ‘Dark Horse’ Case and Its Chilling Effect on Songwriting, VARIETY
(Aug. 6, 2019), https://variety.com/2019/biz/news/katy-perry-dark-horse-lawsuit-joyful-
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However, music is just one area of copyright law. Was it possible that other
creative industries should share this concern as well?
This Note seeks to examine the following questions: given the rise of
copyright infringement claims in the music industry and the substantial
uncertainty surrounding creativity that exists in this area of copyright law after
The Blurred Lines Case, can artists expect this trend to spread to other types of
protected creative works, in particular, motion pictures and other audiovisual
works? Or, is it more probable that the implications of The Blurred Lines Case will
remain contained within the music industry? In the case of the latter, does this
mean that different kinds of creative works are treated differently under
copyright? If so, should this disparity be permitted?
By conducting a thorough analysis of The Blurred Lines holding, its
implications, and copyright law, this Note argues that the results of the present
case is unlikely to spread to other areas of copyright law. Part II provides a
general background of copyright law. Part II also provides a more detailed
discussion of The Blurred Lines Case, to serve as context for stating and analyzing
the questions presented here.
In Part III, this Note conducts an analysis of the current state of other areas
of copyright law, focusing on film, motion pictures, and other audio-visual
works. Specifically, this section will analyze case law to determine what facts,
arguments, and methods of reasoning are typically presented by plaintiffs in these
kinds of infringement lawsuits. Then, it will assess the relative success of these
plaintiffs in obtaining verdicts in their favor. After this undertaking, this Note
predicts how the implications of The Blurred Lines Case are not likely to spread
beyond the film industry. Part III of this Note then argues that the application
of copyright protection varies across different types of creative works. Finally,
Part III considers arguments as to whether this disparity in protection should be
permitted.

noise-chilling-effect-on-songwriting-1203292606/ (arguing that the increase in substantial
verdicts in music copyright infringement cases post-Blurred Lines reveals a need to eliminate
the role of the jury in future cases).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. COPYRIGHT LAW

1. Source and Purpose of U.S. Copyright Law
U.S. copyright law begins with Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, which is commonly referred to as “the Copyright and Patent
Clause.”20 This clause provides that Congress “shall have Power . . . to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”21
The Court has generally interpreted the Copyright Clause to mean that the
purpose of copyright protection is to “enrich[] the general public through access
to creative works,”22 and to “motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward”23 that exists “in the form of
control over the sale or commercial use of copies of their works.”24 Thus, these
characterizations of the Copyright Clause demonstrate that the authority to grant
copyright to an individual rests “on the dual premises that the public benefits
from the creative activities of authors and that copyright protection is a necessary
condition to the full realization of those creative activities.”25 This rationale
allows for the implicit assumption that “absent a public benefit, the grant of
copyright to individuals would be unjustified.”26
The Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to enact legislation “to
provide copyright protection to the extent [it] sees fit.”27 That is, copyright is
protected solely by statute, as the Constitution neither confers nor requires
copyright protection.28

20 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 1 (2020) (citing Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S.
302 (2012); Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 [hereinafter the Copyright Clause].
22 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1982 (2016)(quoting Fogerty v.
Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994)).
23 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
24 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (emphasis added).
25 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed.).
26 Id. (citing Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692,698 (9th Cir.
2015)(Wardlaw, J., concurring)).
27 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 1 (2020) (citing Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d
277 (4th Cir. 2007)).
28 Id. at § 3 (citing Darden, 488 F.3d 277 and Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d
881 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 (explaining how “the protection given to
copyrights is wholly statutory”).
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2. Development of U.S. Copyright Law
In 1790, the First Congress brought forth the principles of the Copyright
Clause by enacting the first copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1790.29 The
initial scope of the 1790 Act was “relatively limited,” offering protection for
“books, maps, and charts for a period of only fourteen years with a renewal
period for another fourteen years.”30 Congress amended the 1790 act several
times throughout the nineteenth century, changing the scope of protected works,
duration of protection, and the registration process. 31 For example, the
amendments expanded the scope of protection to include “historical and other
prints,” dramatic works, photographs, visual art, and expanded the exclusive
rights of authors to include the right of public performance for dramatic works
and musical compositions and the right to create derivative works. 32
The next major copyright legislation passed by Congress was the Copyright
Act of 1909.33 Signed into law by President Theodore Roosevelt, the key features
of this legislation included both a copyright term and renewal term of 28 years,
and also granted the author the ability to terminate any transfer of their copyright
between the initial and renewal periods.34 The 1909 Act experienced three
significant phases of amendment.35 First, three years after its enactment, the
1909 Act was amended to extend protection to motion pictures.36 Second, in
1953, the 1909 Act was further amended to extend recording and performing
rights to nondramatic literary works.37 Finally, in 1972, Congress again extended
copyright protection to sound recordings that were fixed and first published after
the date of enactment.38
In October 1976, President Gerald Ford signed the first and most recent
major revision of copyright law since 1909: the Copyright Act of 1976 (“the 1976
Act”).39 The 1976 Act significantly changed modern copyright law because it

29 Timeline of Copyright Law in the United States: Eighteenth Century, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_18th_century.html (last visited Sept.
24, 2020).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, Pub. L. No. 60-349,
35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
34 Timeline of Copyright Law in the United States: 1900-1950, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_1900-1950.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2020).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Timeline of Copyright Law in the United States: 1950-1997, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_1950-1997.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2020).
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greatly altered the term of protection for new works.40 Rather than protecting
works for a term of years with a renewal period, the 1976 Act provided that new
works created on or after January 1, 1978 were protected for the life of the author
plus seventy years.41 Additionally, the right to terminate transfer of the copyright
between the initial and renewal terms was eliminated and replaced with the right
to terminate transfer after 35 years, subject to specific procedures.42
While the 1976 Act remains the current statutory authority on copyright law
in the United States, Congress has amended it multiple times since its
enactment.43 These revisions have primarily occurred in response to rapidly
changing technologies; for example, given the creation of new mediums of
expression, Congress has added protection for computer programs. 44
Amendments to the 1976 Act have also occurred to reflect the United States’
treaty obligations with other nations, such as the Berne Convention and the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.45
Thus, as copyright law has evolved in the United States, protection under the
1976 Act has greatly expanded.46 After years of legislative efforts, in an everadvancing world, to comport statutory law with the principles of the Copyright
Clause, the thrust of the 1976 Act’s protection is summarized as follows:
authors of original expression shall enjoy the exclusive right to
(1) copy their work; (2) distribute copies to the public; (3) prepare
“derivative works” based upon their work, including translations,
motion picture versions of novels, arrangements, abridgements,
and the like; (4) publicly perform their work, including live
performances, broadcasts, and streaming over the Internet; and
(5) publicly display their work, including displaying artwork in
public places on websites.47
3. Substantive Requirements and Subject Matter of Copyright
The summary of provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act given above dictates
what rights are available to authors under the statute. The following paragraphs
will explain how authors may assert these exclusive rights. First, this Note will
discuss the substantive requirements of copyright protection. Second, given

Id.
Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS
(2018).
47 Id. at 3.
40
41
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these requirements, this Note will list the kinds of works that may be protected
by copyright.
There are two main requirements that must be met for a creative work to be
subject to copyright. First, the 1976 Act provides protection for “original works
of authorship.”48 The modern statute fails to provide a definition for what
constitutes “originality.” However, the relevant House Report explained that
this omission was purposeful because the legislature intended to incorporate
without changing the standard of originality established by courts under the 1909
Act.49
Since the 1909 Act also lacked a definition for originality, courts filled in the
gap by uniformly inferring the originality requirement from the fact that
copyright could only be claimed by “‘authors’ (or their successors in interest).”50
Specifically, courts reasoned that since the author is the “‘originator’” or
“‘beginner’” and “‘first mover of anything’ . . . [,] a work is not a product of an
author unless it is original.”51 Thus, courts construe the meaning of originality
to mean “only that the work owes its origin to [its] author, i.e., is independently
created rather than copied from other works.”52
Second, in order to be eligible for protection under the statute, the original
work must be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”53 This language
simply requires a work of original authorship to have some physical
manifestation.54 This “broad language” was used to “avoid . . . artificial and
largely unjustifiable distinctions,” where “statutory copyrightability” in some
cases “was made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work was
fixed.”55 Therefore, under the 1976 Act, “it makes no difference what the form,
manner, or medium of fixation may be.”56
Taken together, these two requirements allow the following conclusion: so
long as a creative work owes its origin to the author, and it has been fixed in
some form of tangible medium through which “the work can be perceived and
communicated,”57 the requirements of the statute are satisfied, and copyright
protection is triggered.58 As indicated in the language of the statute, the
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2019).
1 NIMMER, supra note 25, at §2.01[A] (quoting H.R. REP NO. 94–1476, at 51 (1976)).
50 Id. at 2 (citing An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, Pub.
L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)).
51 Id. (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351-52 (1991);
Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2002)).
52 Id. (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 345).
53 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2019).
54 1 NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 1.08.
55 H.R. REP NO. 94–1476, at 52 (1976).
56 Id.
57 NETANEL, supra note 46, at 5.
58 Id.
48
49
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following categories of works of authorship may be subject to copyright
protection: (1) literary works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings;
and (8) architectural works.59
4. Establishing a Copyright Infringement Claim
To establish a claim for copyright infringement, a party must satisfy two
requirements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) that another person or
entity copied the constituent elements of the work that are original.60 It is
generally accepted as impossible to prove prong two’s infringement requirement
by direct evidence because the availability of a witness testifying to copying rarely
exists.61 Therefore, a party may use circumstantial evidence to prove an infringer
had “access” to the protected work and that the two works share “substantial
similarity.”62
a. Access
Courts may define “access” as “the actual viewing and knowledge” of a
protected work.63 Similar to the difficulty of establishing direct evidence of
copying, plaintiffs may also find it near impossible to show that the defendant
actually viewed or had knowledge of the work.64 Thus, courts have determined
that, if actual evidence of access is unavailable, showing that the defendant had
an opportunity to view the work is sufficient to allow the factfinder to conclude
copying as a factual matter.65
The implication of this allowance is that the factfinder has the discretion to
disregard a defendant’s uncontroverted testimony that no such access was
available at all.66 Thus, this approach may be fairly characterized as guaranteeing
plaintiffs a finding of infringement.67 However, it is important to note that
opportunity to view a work “does not encompass any bare possibility in the sense
that anything is possible.”68 Instead, “there must be a reasonable possibility of

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2019).
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citing Harper v.
Row, 471 U.S. 539 at 548 (1985)).
61 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.01[B](Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.).
62 Id.
63 Id. at § 13.02[A].
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
59
60
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viewing plaintiff’s work,” rather than a “bare” one.69 Distinguishing a
“reasonable” from a “bare” possibility is “anything but straightforward, which
often makes the determination a “close question.”70
As indicated above, plaintiffs in a copyright infringement suit are typically
required to demonstrate access and substantial similarity.71 However, where the
similarity between two works is so “sufficiently striking” that the “only
explanation for the similarities . . . must be ‘copying rather than … coincidence,
independent creation, or prior common source,’”72 the factfinder “may . . . infer
copying on that basis alone.”73 This concept is known as the “Inverse Ratio
Rule,” and its acceptance and degree of application varies widely among federal
circuit courts.74
b. Substantial Similarity
Substantial similarity is just as, if not more, vital to a plaintiff’s infringement
claim.75 This question is also one of the more complicated areas of copyright
law.76 Specifically, courts find it both “difficult to define and vague to apply”77
given Congress’ lack of statutory guidance and the Supreme Court’s silence as
to what constitutes “substantial.” The analysis has ultimately been left to the
discretion of the lower courts; consequently, a wide range of approaches are
comprised in case law.78
Nevertheless, the vital inquiry here concerns “improper appropriation,” and
while approaches may vary, it is generally understood that a “slight” or “trivial”
similarity is not considered “substantial.” 79 Yet, “exact reproduction” or “near
identity” are not necessary.80 One potentially instructive way to conceptualize
this element of an infringement claim is in terms of what the work is not. For
example, where there is no dispute as to the validity of the plaintiff’s copyright,
access, or the “very strong resemblances” between two works, a court may find

Id.
Id.
71 Id. at § 13.01[B].
72 Id. at § 13.02[B] (citations omitted).
73 Id.
74 Id. at § 13.03[D].
75 Id. at § 13.03[A].
76 Id.
77 2 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6:70 (2d ed. 2011).
78 See id. (“Several approaches, some interrelated, are taken by courts in analyzing works
for substantial similarity.”).
79 4 NIMMER, supra note 61, at § 13.03[A].
80 MILLS, supra note 77.
69
70
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that substantial similarity is lacking where the defendant copied only the
unprotected elements of the plaintiff’s work.81
5. Limits of Copyright Protection
The preceding paragraphs provided an overview of the development of
copyright law in the United States and an explanation of both the scope and
substantive requirements of protection. While the general trend in this area of
law may be fairly characterized as an expansion and responsiveness to
advancement, several limitations on protection have remained constant. The
most relevant limitation for the purposes of this Note is the “idea/expression
dichotomy”.82 This phrase refers to the longstanding principle of copyright law
that protection “extends only to the form in which an author expresses her ideas,
not to the ideas themselves.”83
The idea/expression dichotomy, which was codified in the 1976 Act84, seeks
to strike a balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act “by
permitting the free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s
expression.”85 When construing the statute, the Supreme Court has held that
“no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates,”86 because
“[c]opyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech.”87 Rather, as the
Court has explained, “the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of
free expression,” because in creating “a marketable right to the use of one’s
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate
ideas.”88 Thus, the economic philosophy underlying the Copyright Clause “is
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors.”89
Despite the widespread reliance on the idea/expression dichotomy by courts,
many commentators consider it an illusory distinction.90 For instance, critics

81 4 NIMMER, supra note 61, at § 13.03[A] (citing Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754
F.3d 95, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2014)).
82 NETANEL, supra note 46, at 2.
83 Id.
84 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2019) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.”).
85 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
86 Id.
87 Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971)).
88 Id. at 558.
89 Id. (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
90 See Richard H. Jones, The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 10 PACE
L. REV. 551, 552-553 (1990)(arguing that “the distinction between the idea and expression
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contend that the relationship between idea and expression is best conceptualized
as a continuum because the difference between the two is not binary.91 It is one
of degree.92 The idea-expression dichotomy is also considered impracticable
because courts and commentators consistently fail to “define or clarify exactly
what they mean” when using the terms “idea” and “expression.”93 This aspect
of copyright law is not the focus of this Note; therefore, further elaboration of
the idea/expression dichotomy debate is unnecessary. However, acknowledging
its presence in the copyright landscape leads this discussion to the next major
area of relevant background information: The Blurred Lines Case.
B. THE BLURRED LINES CASE

1. The Blurred Lines Case: Factual Background and Procedural History
The Blurred Lines Case started with a preemptive strike by the three composers
of the hit single from which the litigation derives its name: Robin Thicke, Pharrell
Williams, and T.I.94 The trio filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment
that they were not liable for copyright infringement in response to a
communication from Marvin Gaye’s estate that (1) they believed that the trio’s
“Blurred Lines” infringed on Gaye’s “Got To Give It Up,” and (2) if the trio did
not pay a monetary settlement of the Gaye estate’s claim, the Gaye estate would
initiate litigation for copyright infringement.95
The trio argued that the Gaye estate’s claims did not constitute a basis for
copyright infringement because “being reminiscent of a ‘sound’ is not copyright
infringement.”96 More specifically, they contended that the intent in creating
“‘Blurred Lines’ was to evoke an era.”97 Thus, “the Gaye defendants are claiming
ownership of an entire genre, as opposed to a specific work.”98 This preemptive

dichotomy is misguided and irrelevant.”); see also Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of
Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgements, 66 IND. L.
J. 175 (1990)(evaluating how subjective artistic values held by judges affect determinations of
copyright infringement).
91 Jones, supra note 90, at 578, 598.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 565.
94 See supra Part I (summarizing the events that led to the filing of this lawsuit).
95 Id.; see also Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No.
CV13-06004-JAK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013), 2013 WL 4271752 (seeking a declaratory
judgment that Williams and Thicke’s composition did not infringe on Gaye’s 1977 hit).
96 Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. CV1306004-JAK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013), 2013 WL 4271752.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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strike prompted a counterclaim by the Gaye estate alleging that “Blurred Lines”
infringed on Gaye’s “Got To Give It Up.”99
After losing on their motion for summary judgment, the case proceeded to
trial. The jury found the “Blurred Lines” composers liable for copyright
infringement and awarded the Gaye Estate $4 million in damages and $3.7
million in profits. 100 Due to the publication of “Got to Give It Up” before 1978,
the old statutory framework of the 1909 Copyright Act applied instead of the
1976 Act.101 Therefore, the court ruled that protection afforded by the older
statutory framework did not extend to the commercial sound recordings of “Got
to Give It Up” or “Blurred Lines.”102
After the verdict announcement, many artists, reporters, industry insiders,
and experts voiced various critiques.103 In addition to the common contention
that the denial of the “Blurred Lines” songwriters’ motion for summary
judgment was improper, the main criticism was that the jury instructions were
erroneous.104 Critics asserted that the judge blurred the distinction of what
constitutes copyright infringement by failing to instruct the jury to limit its
evaluation to only the protectable elements of copyright.105 This presumptively
allowed the jury to consider copying an idea as infringement.106 Also, many felt
that the jury went beyond the scope of the evidence by subconsciously
incorporating the inadmissible sound recordings.107 The two songs were
erroneously played during the course of the Gayes’ expert testimony.108
Therefore, to many, it appeared as though the jury reached a conclusion
unsupported by the weight of the evidence.109

99 John Quagliariello, Blurring the Lines: The Impact of Williams v. Gaye on Music Composition, 10
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 133, 137 (2019).
100 Id. at 138; see also Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018).
101 Quagliariello, supra note 99, 137-38.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 138.
104 See Coane & Verrelli, supra note 16 (arguing that the “misleading and inconsistent” jury
instructions in The Blurred Lines Case were a deciding factor in the verdict against Thicke and
Williams).
105 See id. (discussing how the jury was told that they could find infringement if “they
perceive that the ‘total concept and feel’ of the two works are ‘substantially similar.’”).
106 See id. (explaining how critical reactions to The Blurred Lines Case spurred from the
impression that the court had found that paying homage to a “vibe and/or feel” or “genre”
of a previously released and inadmissible master recording constitutes infringement: “[t]his
should not have been the case, as many of those elements were excluded as evidence by virtue
of the sound recordings [under the 1909 Act].”).
107 Quagliariello, supra note 99, at 139.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 138.
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2. The Blurred Lines Case: The Appellate Decision
a. The Majority
Despite the widespread expectation that the “Blurred Lines” songwriters
would win on appeal,110 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict in part and
upheld the remitted damages award for the Gaye Estate.111 The majority rejected
the “Blurred Lines” parties’ contention that the Gayes’ copyright enjoyed only
“thin protection,” stating that “[m]usical compositions are not confined to a
narrow range of expression.”112 The majority explained that music is “comprised
of a large array of elements, some combination of which is protectable by
copyright.”113 Therefore, a party need only demonstrate through expert
testimony that the similarity between two works is (1) “substantial” and (2) “to
the protectable elements.”114 Because the Gayes were not required to prove
“virtual identity” to establish their infringement claim, the court subjected their
copyright to broad protection. 115
Moreover, the majority stated that their decision was a narrow one, and that
it “turned on the procedural posture of the case.”116 Thus, because a high degree
of deference was given to findings of the judge and jury during the trial, the
majority found that the district court did not misstate the law in instructing the
jury.117 Additionally, the majority concluded that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in formulating the instructions. 118 The majority also found that the
district court did not fail to improperly include the commercial sound recordings
of the two works,119 did not improperly admit expert testimony based on
unprotected elements,120 and that the jury’s verdict was not against the clear
weight of the evidence.121

110 See Tim Wu, Why the “Blurred Lines” Verdict Should be Thrown Out, THE NEW YORKER (Mar.
12,
2015,
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/why-the-blurred-linescopyright-verdict-should-be-thrown-out (predicting that the ruling against Thicke and
Williams will be reversed because “to say that something ‘sounds like’ something else does not
amount to copyright infringement.”).
111 Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018).
112 Id. at 1120.
113 Id. (quoting Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004).
114 Id.
115 Id. (holding that “the Gayes’ copyright is not limited to only thin copyright protection”).
116 Id. at 1138.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1107.
120 Id. at 1125.
121 Id.
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b. The Dissent
Judge Nguyen’s dissent sharply disagreed with the majority’s reasoning and
conclusions; also, much of her criticisms and arguments embody the general
consensus across multiple sectors that the Ninth Circuit wrongly decided The
Blurred Lines Case.122 Focusing significantly more on the musical elements of the
two works than the majority, Judge Nguyen criticized the majority’s analysis for
the following reasons. First, by deciding the case on purely procedural grounds,
the majority missed the actual issue at hand—whether attempting to evoke a
“Marvin Gaye style” crossed the legal line into infringement. Second, the
majority failed to distinguish what elements of “Got To Give It Up” should have
received protection. Finally, even if all the elements of Gaye’s song were
protectable, the combination of those elements do not satisfy the substantial
similarity standard.123
Judge Nguyen’s sharpest words for the majority still echoes among critics of
The Blurred Lines Case decision today. In her opinion she states that “the majority
establishe[d] a dangerous precedent that strikes a devastating blow to future
musicians and composers everywhere.”124 In creating this precedent, Nyguyen
continues, “the majority allowed a musical style or ‘groove’ to be copyrighted,”
which will ultimately create a chilling effect on creativity.125 As described in the
introduction, this is an ongoing and contentious debate in the music industry. 126
For the purposes of this Note, however, it is a framework for analyzing the issue
at hand: whether this potential trend of an unprecedented scope of copyright
protection will spill over into other areas of copyright law, specifically film and
motion pictures.
III. ANALYSIS
The focus of this Note’s analysis shifts to a different area of copyright law:
film and motion pictures. First, this Note discusses and analyzes the current
state of film copyright law. Second, based on my findings, this Note predicts the
relative likelihood of a post-Blurred Lines landscape spilling over into in the film
industry. Finally, this Note analyzes whether a disparity in how different works
are treated under copyright exists and considers whether any such differential
treatment should be permitted.

Id. at 1138 (Nguyen, J., dissenting).
Quagliariello, supra note 99, at 140-41.
124 Williams, 895 F.3d at 1138.
125 Quagliariello, supra note 99101, at 141.
126 See supra Part I (noting the tension between creativity and ownership rights inherent in
copyright protection).
122
123
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A. COPYRIGHT LAW AND FILM

The previous discussion of The Blurred Lines Case prompts an even more
specific question within the broader one presented here: what aspects of film
could leave the industry susceptible to a copyright infringement claim, and
subsequent decision, like Blurred Lines? By analyzing recent copyright
infringement cases in the film industry, this section seeks to exemplify the
possible opportunities for the controversy from the music industry to spread into
film. Before conducting this analysis, it is important to first acknowledge a key
caveat in this area of copyright law: the scènes à faire doctrine. Translated as
“scenes which must be done,”127 this doctrine provides that copyright protection
does not extend to “similarity of incidents or plot that necessarily follow[] from
a common theme or setting.”128 For example, where two works shared common
themes such as “electrified fences” and “dinosaur nurseries,” no infringement
was found because they “flowed from the concept of a dinosaur zoo.”129
As a result of this doctrine, factfinders automatically treat copyright
infringement claims concerning film differently than those that deal with music.
Specifically, it appears that the scènes à faire doctrine works against liberal
copyright awards to plaintiffs by forcing the factfinder to filter through the
unprotected elements and tease out the soundness of a plaintiff’s claim. In other
words, the scènes à faire doctrine operates as a preliminary inquiry and,
ultimately, a mitigating factor on the difficulties of the substantial similarity
prong.
1. Marcus v. ABC Signature Studios, Inc.
In Marcus v. ABC Signature Studios, Inc., the works disputed concerned two
different television scripts about a family moving to a new neighborhood and
navigating “black” stereotypes.130 In Marcus, Plaintiff alleged that defendant used
plaintiff’s submission of a script in a screenwriter contest sponsored by
defendant’s production company to develop the pilot for an ABC series called
Black-ish.131 Plaintiff’s infringement claim primarily focused on similarities
between the theme and plot of the two works.132
The circuit court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, stating that “[a]
work’s theme is its overarching message,” and thus, “[t]here is no protection for

127 4 NIMMER, supra note 61, at § 13.03[B][4] (quoting Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co.,
85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1949)).
128 Id.
129 Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002).
130 Marcus v. ABC Signature Studios, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 3d 1056, 1059-60 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
131 Id. at 1059.
132 Id. at 1059-61.
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stock themes or themes that flow necessarily from a basic premise.”133 For
example, the court acknowledged that the two works shared the element of
“acting black”; but, because it did not exist as an underlying message in the
works, the court denied that this constituted a theme.134 Furthermore, since any
attempts by characters in defendant’s work to use dialogue to “act black” were
“extremely brief,” they were “not a large point of contention” in the plot.135
Additionally, in Marcus, the court stated that the similar themes of “moving into
the majority culture [and] constantly feel[ing] . . . out of place” did not amount
to infringement because it arose from a basic plot idea.136 Therefore, it was not
protected, and the court was required to “disregard [the theme of feeling out of
place] . . . in looking at Plaintiff’s ability to plead substantial similarity.”137 The
Marcus court also rejected claims of substantial similarity regarding the plots of
the two works.138 For instance, the court stated that the shared elements of
characters from both works receiving internal promotions at their jobs and the
show’s subsequent exploration of the “characters’ reactions to those
promotions” were “basic plot ideas . . . ‘not protected by copyright law.’”139
2. Sheldon Abend Revocable Trust v. Spielberg
In Sheldon Abend Revocable Trust v. Spielberg, plaintiff brought an infringement
action alleging that Spielberg’s motion picture, Disturbia, infringed on plaintiff’s
copyright in a short story entitled Rear Window and “the derivative Alfred
Hitchcock film of the same name.”140 The court granted defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.141
While the court did not explicitly refer to the scènes à faire doctrine, the
court’s influence is implicit within its reasoning. Prior to applying the substantial
similarity test, the court stated that where, as in Sheldon, “a work is an
amalgamation of protectible and unprotectible elements,” the court must “first
filter [the unprotectible elements] out from consideration.”142 For example, the
court reasoned that the similarity of plot points of “peril” and “suspense”

133 Id. at 1067 (quoting Silas v. Home Box Off., Inc., 201 F.Supp. 3d 1158, 1180 (C.D.Cal.,
2016)).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1068.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1065-66.
139 Id. at 1067 (quoting Campbell v. Walt Disney Co., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1112 (N.D.
Cal. 2010)).
140 Sheldon Abend Revocable Tr. v. Spielberg, 748 F.Supp. 2d 200, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 204.
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between the two works was “broad” and at a “level of generality [that] is not
probative for the question of infringement.”143
These cases are just a snippet of the overarching theme observed in copyright
cases in the film industry. Taken together, it appears that the application of
copyright protection is much more restrained in the film industry. The scènes à
faire doctrine explains this difference, since it operates as a filter on a plaintiff’s
claim, with the principal effect of extracting the protectable elements of the work
from the unprotectable ones. Thus, the substantial similarity inquiry is much
more precise and consistent in infringement cases regarding the film industry.
It follows, therefore, that film artists are engaged in a much more stable
industry that is not susceptible to a decision like The Blurred Lines Case. If true,
then it also follows that the prospect of a spillover of any potential “chilling
effect” on creativity from the music to film industry is also quite slim.
Accordingly, does this mean that different kinds of works are treated differently
under copyright? If so, is this apparent differential treatment an acceptable
feature of copyright law? Or, should it be troubling? The following section seeks
to assess these and similar questions.
B. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT BETWEEN KINDS OF WORKS

As discussed in the preceding section, it appears that infringement cases in
this area are not susceptible to the same kind of uncertainty that currently
pervades the music industry. Therefore, a disparity in treatment among various
works in copyright does appear to exist. The next inquiry, then, is whether this
disparity in treatment under copyright should be acceptable.
The differential treatment is unacceptable for two reasons. First, consider
the plain language of the Copyright Act. § 102 of the Copyright Act lists
categories of works of authorship that are subject to copyright protection and
conveys the idea-expression dichotomy as a limitation on protection. This
section does not provide any notion or indication that the extent of copyright
protection may vary across the categories of works of authorship. Thus,
differential treatment constitutes a misinterpretation and misapplication of the
Copyright Act.
Second, differential treatment of protected works conflicts with common
understandings of fairness. Allowing differential treatment among works of
authorship creates the implication that certain works of authorship are more
deserving of protection than others. This implication is problematic because it
could create a de facto hierarchy among infringement claims, communicating
that some kinds of creative works are more worthy of protection than others.
Consequently, plaintiffs may opt to forgo the time and expense of litigation.
Plaintiffs may reasonably infer from the collective body of infringement case law
143

Id. at 208.
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that courts predetermine the merits of a claim on the basis of what kind of
protected work is at issue rather than whether infringement actually occurred.
Hierarchical protections, whether perceived or actual, within copyright may also
leave many authors feeling unmotivated to protect their creative works through
registration at all. In particular, the registration process may seem futile to
authors within “lesser valued” categories, since they could not reasonably expect
to also enjoy the full force of protections guaranteed by the Copyright Act.
Therefore, differential treatment of protected works is fundamentally unfair as it
may create substantial uncertainty for some authors’ ability to assert and/or
maintain valid ownership rights of their creative works.
IV. CONCLUSION
After The Blurred Lines Case, panic spread throughout the music industry.
Many perceived the decision as a dangerous expansion of copyright protection.
Specifically, it was inferred from the majority’s opinion that the “groove” or
“feel” of a song could now be protected under copyright. Thus, it was asserted
that the ultimate implication of the decision would be a chilling effect on
creativity in the industry because songwriters would now create their works with
uncertainty of litigation.
While a great deal of attention has been given to the implications of this
decision in the music industry, the impact of The Blurred Lines Case in other areas
of copyright has received little attention, especially in film and motion picture.
As assessed in the preceding section, it appears that possible implications of The
Blurred Lines Case are contained within the music industry. In particular, the
application of copyright protection is much more restrained in the film industry,
because the scènes à faire doctrine operates as a filter on a plaintiff’s claim, with
the principal effect of extracting the protectable elements of the work from the
unprotectable ones.
Consequently, a disparity in treatment among works exists in copyright law.
Allowing differential treatment among works of authorship creates the
implication that certain works of authorship are more deserving of protection
than others. These findings prompt the following questions: should particular
measures should be taken to address the disparity? If so, by what means? This
Note does not seek to answer these questions; instead, this Note considers the
probability of a particular trend in one area of copyright, spreading into another.
The findings presented indicate that the probability is slight, because a disparity
of treatment exists among protected works in copyright. Thus, further research,
study, and analysis of this current landscape in copyright law, which is beyond
the scope of this Note, is necessary to answer these two questions. In the
meantime, the line between paying homage and copyright infringement is an
increasingly blurred, litigiously risky, and expensive one to test. Singer-
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songwriters, musicians, and producers alike should tread lightly in their creative
process: that “groove” you are using may be a hit in more than one way.
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